Rivers
The Drownings on Bull Creek
Three boaters have drowned on Bull Creek since 2019, all at or near the same spot. In 2017, a riverside landowner built a concrete low-water bridge across the stream to connect his properties on either side. At low water, boaters were forced to stop at the bridge and drag their boats over it. Pipe culverts had been built into the bridge to allow water to flow under it, but these openings quickly became plugged with gravel and brush, forcing water to flow over the top.
At low water, it wasn’t a big deal—one simply slid his or her boat over the smooth, algae-lubricated surface of the bridge. But at high water, it became a very big deal. The bridge acted like a low-head dam, creating a dangerous hydraulic that could flip boats and drown boaters.
Water flowing over the top of a dam (or bridge) forms what is known in river runners’ parlance as a “hydraulic,” or “hole.” The flowing mass of water coursing over the crest of the dam or bridge plunges to the bottom on the downstream side, pushing the water below the drop downward. Water near the surface, just below the drop, actually flows upstream to fill in the valley, the “hole,” created by the downwardly plunging flow (see diagram).
The result is that objects that float, like a log, or a barrel, or a person in a life jacket, can become trapped in the hole’s mean embrace. Holes produced naturally, as by boulders, are usually irregular in shape, often providing for escape at the ragged edge. But if it’s a smooth hydraulic, like one formed by a dam or bridge, a person can get hopelessly trapped, unable to swim out.
For boaters who aren’t prepared for what the water will do to them, the violence of a large hydraulic will almost invariably flip the boat. With luck, the person, now in the water, will flush out downstream. If wearing a life jacket they can swim to shore or if someone is nearby, be rescued.
But in higher water, and particularly with no life jacket, a swimmer may be pounded by rocks and waves and have a long swim or struggle to get to shore. A long, panicky swim in cold water and powerful currents, trying to keep one’s head above water, quickly saps the energy. Hypothermia, at least, and often drowning can be the result.
The three Bull Creek boaters drowned between 2019 and 2020, after the installation of the bridge, and all at high or medium-high water levels. At least two people, one of whom drowned, were not aware that the bridge had been installed since they last floated Bull Creek.
After the drowning in June 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers inspected the bridge and determined that it had not been properly constructed. The Corps directed the owner to tear out the structure and replace it with a new one in compliance with permit requirements. The owner did just that.
But during the re-construction process, the contractors excavated a 900-foot long trench in the gravel streambed below the construction site, apparently to “dewater” it so they could pour concrete. When I saw this huge trench in the riverbed (see photo), I went ballistic. I called the Department of Natural Resources and Missouri Department of Conservation to complain about the terrible environmental damage.
The drownings on Bull Creek made me aware of serious shortcomings in rules to prevent these kinds of tragedies. I learned that:
1. The Corps has a “goal” of inspecting at least 20% of small river crossings, which they consider “de minimus” structures. In other words, the Corps, which focuses mainly on “big” projects like dams and river navigation, considers this little bridge over Bull Creek hardly worthy of its attention.
2. The Corps never inspected the bridge to make sure it was constructed according to the permit. (As indicated above, they don’t have to). Not long after the bridge was installed, a flood washed out the approaches on both ends.
3. The contractor then repaired the bridge, raising it higher than it had been before. At that point, the bridge no longer conformed to the original design that was permitted.
4. Upon being made aware of the bridge's dangerous nature, the Corps told the owner the bridge would have to be removed and a new, safer, raised-span bridge installed. If the bridge had never been linked to the drownings, by me and the media, it might have never been removed.
5. It was very difficult to find information about how, or even exactly where, the drownings occurred. Non-emergency personnel are restricted in obtaining accident reports that might shed light on what exactly caused the drownings.
6. The new raised span bridge is safer and allows for fish migration, but it is so low to the water that a canoe can’t pass under it at most levels. This, plus the closing of accesses, has greatly constrained the floating opportunities on Bull Creek.
The buttons show how dangerous hydraulics form below dams, particularly at high water. In the case of the Lake Springfield dam, the “boils” (where water that has plunged to the bottom rises again) are up to twenty feet from the foot of the dam. All the surface water and floating logs within this distance are moving back TOWARD the dam. This shows that a swimmer would also be pulled back into the hydraulic. This is a KILLING MACHINE. At the Ozark Dam, the hydraulic can be seen holding and recirculating logs and floating objects.
Three boaters have drowned on Bull Creek since 2019, all at or near the same spot. In 2017, a riverside landowner built a concrete low-water bridge across the stream to connect his properties on either side. At low water, boaters were forced to stop at the bridge and drag their boats over it. Pipe culverts had been built into the bridge to allow water to flow under it, but these openings quickly became plugged with gravel and brush, forcing water to flow over the top.
At low water, it wasn’t a big deal—one simply slid his or her boat over the smooth, algae-lubricated surface of the bridge. But at high water, it became a very big deal. The bridge acted like a low-head dam, creating a dangerous hydraulic that could flip boats and drown boaters.
Water flowing over the top of a dam (or bridge) forms what is known in river runners’ parlance as a “hydraulic,” or “hole.” The flowing mass of water coursing over the crest of the dam or bridge plunges to the bottom on the downstream side, pushing the water below the drop downward. Water near the surface, just below the drop, actually flows upstream to fill in the valley, the “hole,” created by the downwardly plunging flow (see diagram).
The result is that objects that float, like a log, or a barrel, or a person in a life jacket, can become trapped in the hole’s mean embrace. Holes produced naturally, as by boulders, are usually irregular in shape, often providing for escape at the ragged edge. But if it’s a smooth hydraulic, like one formed by a dam or bridge, a person can get hopelessly trapped, unable to swim out.
For boaters who aren’t prepared for what the water will do to them, the violence of a large hydraulic will almost invariably flip the boat. With luck, the person, now in the water, will flush out downstream. If wearing a life jacket they can swim to shore or if someone is nearby, be rescued.
But in higher water, and particularly with no life jacket, a swimmer may be pounded by rocks and waves and have a long swim or struggle to get to shore. A long, panicky swim in cold water and powerful currents, trying to keep one’s head above water, quickly saps the energy. Hypothermia, at least, and often drowning can be the result.
The three Bull Creek boaters drowned between 2019 and 2020, after the installation of the bridge, and all at high or medium-high water levels. At least two people, one of whom drowned, were not aware that the bridge had been installed since they last floated Bull Creek.
After the drowning in June 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers inspected the bridge and determined that it had not been properly constructed. The Corps directed the owner to tear out the structure and replace it with a new one in compliance with permit requirements. The owner did just that.
But during the re-construction process, the contractors excavated a 900-foot long trench in the gravel streambed below the construction site, apparently to “dewater” it so they could pour concrete. When I saw this huge trench in the riverbed (see photo), I went ballistic. I called the Department of Natural Resources and Missouri Department of Conservation to complain about the terrible environmental damage.
The drownings on Bull Creek made me aware of serious shortcomings in rules to prevent these kinds of tragedies. I learned that:
1. The Corps has a “goal” of inspecting at least 20% of small river crossings, which they consider “de minimus” structures. In other words, the Corps, which focuses mainly on “big” projects like dams and river navigation, considers this little bridge over Bull Creek hardly worthy of its attention.
2. The Corps never inspected the bridge to make sure it was constructed according to the permit. (As indicated above, they don’t have to). Not long after the bridge was installed, a flood washed out the approaches on both ends.
3. The contractor then repaired the bridge, raising it higher than it had been before. At that point, the bridge no longer conformed to the original design that was permitted.
4. Upon being made aware of the bridge's dangerous nature, the Corps told the owner the bridge would have to be removed and a new, safer, raised-span bridge installed. If the bridge had never been linked to the drownings, by me and the media, it might have never been removed.
5. It was very difficult to find information about how, or even exactly where, the drownings occurred. Non-emergency personnel are restricted in obtaining accident reports that might shed light on what exactly caused the drownings.
6. The new raised span bridge is safer and allows for fish migration, but it is so low to the water that a canoe can’t pass under it at most levels. This, plus the closing of accesses, has greatly constrained the floating opportunities on Bull Creek.
The buttons show how dangerous hydraulics form below dams, particularly at high water. In the case of the Lake Springfield dam, the “boils” (where water that has plunged to the bottom rises again) are up to twenty feet from the foot of the dam. All the surface water and floating logs within this distance are moving back TOWARD the dam. This shows that a swimmer would also be pulled back into the hydraulic. This is a KILLING MACHINE. At the Ozark Dam, the hydraulic can be seen holding and recirculating logs and floating objects.